Secure communication in FRTP by Stabell-Kulø, Tage
REPORT
Computer Science Technical Report   February 
Secure Communication in Frtp
Tage StabellKul
INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES
Department of Computer Science
University of Troms N TROMS	 Norway Telephone 
     Telefax 
    
Abstract
To ensure privacy users of the File Repository Transfer Protocol Frtp may
require that communication partners are properly authenticated If one partner
wants the communication to be crypted the other must honor the request This
report describes how authentication and privacy are realized It is shown by
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The File Repository Fr is part of the Pasta project The aim of Pasta is to gain better
insight into the fundamental problem of partitioned data The vehicle is the Fr utilized
by portable computers With Fr we will investigate disconnected operations via pessimistic
concurrency control
Servers running the Fr provide users access to storage through the File Repository Trans
fer Protocol Frtp For simplicity Frtp isAsciibased that is all commands and responses
are in Ascii This makes it less hard to debug clients and servers On the other hand it makes
equally easy to eavesdrop on the communication Any simple networksnier will do since
all commands and responses are sent without any encoding in Ascii In the developing and
debugging phase this is not a problem but as the repository is used on a regular basis
users wants privacy Even if there is a desire for privacy in general transporting les across
networks belonging to other organizations places focus on the communication as such This
paper describes the functionality included in Frtp to ensure secure communication
This report starts out by describing the relevant parts of Frtp and show some examples
of how the protocol is used In section  we sketch how authentication is performed and
privacy obtained The emphasis is is placed on describing the protocol and we give only
informal description on the issues concerning authentication and privacy In section  we give
a short overview of the logic we use and in section  we describe how the public keys of users
and servers are distributed The goals of the protocol of interest to us here are presented
in section  Section  contains the proofs that the requirements set forth in section  are
indeed met In other words we show that the protocol really authenticates the two parties
and it does so without being prone for replay or other attacks
This report does not contain any new results its aim is simply to give the reader condence
in the secrecy provided by Frtp ie the secrecy is as secure as the keys and the cryptographic
algorithms used
We do not include any implementation details as the emphasis in this report is on the
Helo and Secure protocols per se This work is build upon Frtp version  and is planned
to be included in Frtp version  Version  will be downwards compatible with version 
 File Repository Transfer Protocol
The Fr is a software system that is design to support users of portable computers It does so
by providing a repository in which users can store les The system enforces currencycontrol
and manages state necessary to facilitate cooperation between users of les even without
being able to use call back to ensure consistency The users interact with the system
through Frtp The Fr is realized as servers running at the sites providing this service to
users
The system is based on the notion of servers and clients Servers store les and infor
mation about le on behalf of clients This results in a clear commandresponse style of
communication Servers do not initiate any activity The overall protocol is modelled after
Nntp and Smtp in this respect
 
Pasta is a joint eort between researchers at the Dipartimento di Ingegneria dellInformazione Universita
di Pisa Italy and Seksjon for Informatikk Universitetet i Troms Norway
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S listens at a reserved TCP port




 Welcome to server Barf
C CREATE foo
S  File Created
C LIST
S 






S  File deleted
Figure  Example of Frtp In the example S indicates statements made by the server
and C indicate statements made by the client Notice how a single  dot terminates
a series of lines of data sent from the server to the client This is inherited from Smtp and
Nntp
A sequence of commands and responses in which a client creates a le lists a directory
and deletes the same le again is shown in Figure
Since les can contain arbitrary bit patterns the actual le data is sent between the server
and the client outside the command stream There are  commands in total Only two of
them are of interest to us here Helo that starts the sequence of messages leading to mutual
authentication and Secure that initiate private encrypted communication
 Helo
Authentication is not per se required by Frtp But it is required that the server honor a
request from a user that wants to authenticate it and thereby authenticating itself and a
user may nd that a server has been congured in such a way that it will only honor requests
from users it can authenticate
The user signals to the server desire for mutual authentication by means of the Helo
command The usage of Helo is shown in Figure  The rst encrypted message from
the server contains the users nounce the string UserNounce encrypted with the servers
private key followed by a blank line and then a new nounce ServerNounce The client
answers by sending the servers nounce back encrypted with its own private key
Informally the server has proven who it is by making a signature on the clients nounce
and the client does the same thing with the servers nounce Observe that this protocol only
ensures authentication and that secure communication is assumed
 Secure
If the client or the server feels the need for privacy it can ask the other party for it by means
of the Secure command The command need not be honored the necessary resources may
not be available in which case the connection can be terminated an example of its usage can
be found in Figure  Informally the two parties prove who they are by signing each others

C HELO TageStabellKul UserNounce

















S  Authentication OK
Figure  The Helo command The two large messages are armored encoding of a bit
stream converting it to a format suitable for usage in an Ascii protocol
nounces The users nounce will be used to encrypt all subsequent communication session
key The Frtp protocol will be visible only after decryption Note that the  dot a
required part of textmessages in Frtp is sent in clear text This is to make it possible for
the parties to know when a message has ended and to make cryptoanalysis harder The
Secure protocol is modelled after Denning
 p 
 Logic of Authentication
Frtp will be used in two settings with dierent assumptions
  Where the two parties can assume that the network provides privacy With this support
of this kind only authentication is needed
  Where no assumptions are made Both authentication and exchange of a session key
are necessary
The former is typically used when two machines are connected by modems that provides hard
ware encryptionsuch modems are commonplaceor where the operating system ensures the
privacy of communication As authentication on a secure channel is trivialthe assumptions
one makes are powerfulthe proof is short In the latter case the proof is still quite short
since we have chosen a solution to the problem related to distribution of encryption keys that
gives us an advantageous staring positions
We use the logic presented in Burrows with the notation used by the same authors
in Burrows We will summarize the postulates and rules we will need in our analysis of the
two protocols The original work that is Burrows contains more rules and postulates than

S 
		 Welcome to server Foo
C CREATE bar
S  I only speak to users I know
C SECURE













Figure  The Secure command As with the Helo command the two large messages are
armored encoding of a bitstream converting it to a format suitable for usage in an Ascii
protocol
we present here But we add one new postulate and include in the discussion the rationale
behind it
  The messagemeaning rules concerns the interpretation of messages For shared keys
we believe that if P and Q share a secret key K and P sees a message encrypted by
K P believes that Q encrypted it
P believes Q
K
 P P sees fXg
K
P believes Q said X
P
For a publicsecret keypair we assume that data encrypted with one part of the key
can be decrypted with the other We use K  to denote the secret part and K for the
public part of a keypair KK  If X is encrypted with the public part we write
fXg
K
 and if X encrypted with the secret part we write fXg
K  

We have two postulates on keypairs The rst states that the owner of the secret key
can decrypt data encrypted with the public part
P believes
K




If data is encrypted with the secret part that is it can be decrypted with the public part
we assume the owner of the secret key did the encryption We refer to the encryption
with the secret part of a keypair as a signature
P believes
K
 QP sees fXg
K  
P believes Q said X
P

  For nounce veri	cation if P believes that if a message X is fresh and that Q said X
P believes that Q believes X Fresh indicates that the value has not been used before
and that it is a random value
P believes freshX P believes Q said X
P believes Q believes X
P
P believes Q believes X means that P believes that Q is taking part in this run of
the protocolit is not a replay of an earlier run
  We assume that a message containing two or more parts and that has been encrypted
or signed is treated as an integral messageit is not possible to merge two encrypted
messages into a single new one or split an encrypted message into smaller parts without
knowing the relevant keys
P believes Q believesXY 
P believes Q believes X
P
The same holds for freshness
P believes freshX
P believes fresh XY 
P
Notice that if P believes freshX and P seesXY  it is not valid to conclude
freshY 
  On jurisdiction we postulate that if P believes that Q controls X and P believes Q
believes X P believes X as well
P believes Q controls XP believes Q believes X
P believes X
P	
For nounces this implies that P have faith in Qs ability and willingness to generate
proper values
  If P believes that a key K is shared with Q and sees X encrypted with K P will
believe that Q did the encryption Q once said X This is the postulate on message
meaning P  If K is fresh Q must have done the encryption recently at least after




 P P believes freshK P sees fXg
K





As a corollary we note that if P believes the key K is fresh and shared with Q and sees
X encrypted with K P will believe that Q encrypted X now that is Q believes X 
P believes Q
K
 P P believes freshK P sees fXg
K
P believes Q believes X
P

In Burrows p 	 it is said that nounceverication P is the only way to promote
P believes Q said X into P believes Q believes X and the freshness of X is used

In P
 we use a fresh key instead However notice that P can only verify that X is
encrypted with K when X already is known to P 
The two postulates P
 and its corollary P
 are new and do not appear in Burrows
but they can be viewed as just a combination of the postulate on messagemeaning P
and on nounceverication P 
In the following we will refer to these postulates as we use them
 Key Distribution
The Fr relies on both publickey and sharedkey cryptography in order to achieve its goals
The protocol is designed to meet the needs in a well dened environment and keydistribution
reects this
Most authentication protocols rely on a trusted third party This trust must be general
the party is trusted to keep its private key secret generate good session keys upon request
not share with others their nounces and keys meant to be kept secret and to execute the
protocol faithfully
In general communication with a third party is not possible in for users of the Fr as
the system is designed to also support portable computers That is portables will often
connect to the servers using modems In this situation it is impossible to contact a third
party without incuring high costs particularly in time In other words precautions must be
taken to ensure that the user either have the servers key available or have the possibility to
infer trust in the servers key This must also be the case when the credentials are presented
by someone who claims to be the server itself
When a person wants to become a user of the Fr she will have to contact an administrator
Regarding the servers public key the users has two not mutual exclusive options First she
can copy it This way she can later readily verify the servers signatures If this is undesirable
possibly due to constraints on disk space she can also choose to sign the key The latter is
a proof that she trusts the ownership of the key
In the former case the user U will believe that the Ks indeed is the public key of S  The
belief is established during a personal meeting
In the latter case the user gave the server the certicate fSKsgK  u   When it later is
presented to the user presumably by the server the user and anyone with access to the
users public key can verify that U believed that Ks was Ss public key The string S
in the certicate should probably include a timestamp to ensure that certicates containing
old possibly compromised keys can be recognized
This technique for the user to obtain the servers key is not yet part of Frtp and it
will not be given further treatment we will in the following assume that U believes
Ks S 
Notice that in cases where the user has good connectivity the keydistribution can be done
by a variety of protocols Liebl
Again it must be stressed that both principals are assumed to be honest

 The Goals
The exchange of messages has as its goal in get to a situation where the server and the client
have trust in each others presence The authenticationphase is complete when
U believes S believes X HG
and
S believes U believes X  HG
This means that both the server and the user believes that the other party has seen the mes
sage X that is they both believe that the other party exists took part in the authentication
This is of no use unless the partners trust the channel that connects them For privacy in










U believes S believes S
K
 U SG
That is a shared key Ksu must be known to both parties and they must both believe
that the other party also knows the key
We will show that the Helo command and its responses leads the server and the user
to a situation where HG and HG holds Furthermore we will show that after having
gone through the Secure command and its responses SGSG all holds
 Analysis
We will proceed in our analysis in the same way as in Burrows The analysis consists of
three parts describe the protocol idealize it and the analysis proper As is usual we assume
that both parties are able and willing to execute the protocol faithfully threats against
secrecy originates from a hostile third party
	 The Helo protocol
Section  we showed the protocol as it will look to an implementor The essence is
Message  U  S  UNu
Message  S  U  fNugK  s  Ns
Message  U  S  fNsgK  u
The Helo protocol will only be used on communicationchannels that already provide
privacy This means that noone else can intrude on the line without being detected for
example by the fact that an intruder can only disturb the activity Since the line is assumed
private an intruder can not insert any valid data or commands This also has the implication
that nonencrypted parts of the protocol need not be removed in the idealized protocol The
idealized protocol is as follows
Message  S  U  fNugK  s  Ns
Message  U  S  fNsgK  u
	
Note that the two parts of Message  belongs together as if the message had been
fNU  NSgK  
S
 in that they are linked together even without having to be encrypted together
In general encryption is computationally expensive and should not be done when avoidable





U believes fresh Nu
S believes fresh Ns
Message  does not lead any of them to believe anything By using the messagemeaning
postulate P Message  gives
U believes
Ks SU sees fNugK  s
U believes S said Nu
and by using the nounceveri	cation rule P we obtain
U believes fresh Nu U believes S said Nu
U believes S believes Nu
HG
which is what we desire for U  Symmetrically by using P Message  gives
S believes
Ku U S sees fNsgK  u
S believes U said Ns
and by again using the nounceveri	cation rule P we obtain
S believes fresh Ns S believes U said Ns
S believes U believes Ns
HG
which is what we desire for S Both S and U now knows that the other party is present now
	 The Secure protocol
Informally the Secure protocol is used between a server and a user when they through an
insecure network want to establish a secure and authenticated channel This channel will be
a shared secret a session key which will be used as a shared key in symmetric encryption As
with the Helo protocol the keydistribution problem is assumed to be solved as described
in section  The protocol will achieve making both parties believe that the other party is
taking part in the protocol authentication and exchange a session key that will be used
throughout the duration of the session to encrypt communication and thereby creating the
secure channel between them
In contrast to most other settings the two parties cannot contact a mutual trusted third
party in order to facilitate authentication This also imply that the session key must be
generated by one of the parties the user will generate the key This means that





In Burrows p  it is noted that in the general case this is a dubious assumption
the question is not whether U is willing to generate a good key but if it is competent In
our setting however any data transmitted over the secure channel will belong to or being
controlled by the user If the user chooses a bad session key it will not represent a threat to
other users data or the servers integrity For this reason we let the user as opposed to the
server choose the key
The Secure protocol can be described as follows
Message  S  U  T
Message  U  S  U ffS TKsugK  u gKs
Message  S  U  fTg
Ksu
The rst message appears before the Secure command as one can see in the example 
on page  It is the timestamp given by the server as part of the initial Welcome message
but logically it is part of the secure protocol It is the current time followed by a serial number





S believes U controls S
K
U
U believes S controls T
U believes freshKsu
When S believes that a timestamp T is fresh it implies that the granularity of the clock
by which it is generated must be ner than the rate by which connections are established S
must ensure that all T indeed are fresh not used before In Abadi section  principle 	
reads
The use of a predictable quantity such as the value of a counter can serve in
guaranteeing newness through a challengeresponse exchange But if a predictable
quantity is to be eective it should be protected so that an intruder cannot
simulate a challenge and later replay a response
In the Secure protocol if the value T was used as a challenge an intruder can deceive S by
acting as follows When U tries to contact S the intruder intercepts the call answers with a
future value of T  The intruder records U s reply Later at the correct moment the intruder
connects to S and after having seen the previously used value of T  it sends the reply it
previously got from U  S will now incorrectly believe that it communicated with U  Even
though the intruder can not obtain any service from S in the role of U the false information
on the presence of U can lead S into disarray
To render this impossible the time is concatenated with a nounce the colon separates
the two We assume
S believes freshT 





Notice that the key to be used as a session key between S and K the key Ksu is written as
S
K
U in the idealized protocol when it represent the existence of the key but as Ksu when it
is used
The idealized protocol then becomes








Message  S  U  fTg
Ksu
The name of S has been removed from message  as it does not change the proof The
rationale for its presence in the protocol is discussed below
With the postulates for public keys P Message  gives
S believes
K














With the messagemeaning postulate for public keys P we obtain
S believes






S believes U said T S
K
U
Since it is assumed that S believes freshT  the postulate on combined freshness P we
obtain
S believes freshT 
S believes freshT S
K
U
The postulate on nounce veri	cation P then lead to
S believes U said T S
K
U S believes freshT S
K
U
S believes U believes T S
K
U
with the postulate for combined blief P
S believes U believesT S
K
U




If Message  had been






T not signed together with S
K
U we could have derived S believes U said S
K
U but not
S believes fresh S
K
U  This conveys the situation where an intruder intercepts the message
removes U s good key and insert an old presumably compromised key
Furthermore if Message  had been
Message  U  S  ffTKsugK  u gKs
the name of S not included in the signed part of the message a server S can deceive the
user U by connecting to another server S and forward to U the timestamp presented to S
by S When U sends the sessionkey to S S simply remove the encryption reencrypt with
the public key of S and forward the key S will now believe that it talks to U  Including the
name of the server is in accordance with Abadi section  where principle  reads

If the identity of a principal is essential to the meaning of a message it is prudent
to mention the principals name explicitly in the message
Although we did assume that the participants are honest and strive to execute the protocols
faithfully having the name of the intended server in the certicate makes it possible to store
data also on untrusted servers since the server cannot do more wrong than destroy or give
away the data an untrusted server is not able to modify or delete data stored on more trusted
servers
Message  contains U but this has been removed from the idealized protocol since it is
not bound to anything by encryption Its presence makes it possible for S to know which
users public key to use
If we continue the rule for juristiction P	 gives
S believes U controls S
K











 UU believes freshKsu U sees fTgKsu




In the Frtp protocol T shall be the time as known to S and if we use the corollary of P





 UU believes freshKsu U sees fTgKsu
U believes S believes T
and with the rule for jurisdiction P	 we get
U believes S controls TU believes S believes T
U believes T
This implies that U can perform a loose synchronize its clock with S by subtracting the time
spend executing the protocol
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